| “监督机制”还是“掏空行为”：超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资 |
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| 引用本文：熊 磊1,2，陈镜西1，苏 春1,2，李先洪1.“监督机制”还是“掏空行为”：超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资[J].财经理论与实践,2024,(2):94-103 |
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| 中文摘要:以2007—2021年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象，深入探究超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现：超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资具有显著的促进作用，验证了超额聘任独立董事属于一种“监督机制”；超额聘任独立董事通过抑制管理层短视和大股东掏空行为来促进企业进行环保投资；在重污染行业、两职合一以及独立董事薪酬较低的企业中，超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的促进作用更显著。 |
| 中文关键词:超额聘任独立董事 管理层短视 大股东掏空 企业环保投资 |
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| “Supervisory Mechanism” or “Tunneling Behavior” Over-appointment of Independent Directors and Corporate Environmental Investment |
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| Abstract:Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research object, this paper deeply explores the impact and mechanism of over-appointment of independent directors on corporate environmental investment. The study found that over-appointment of independent directors has a significant role in promoting corporate environmental investment, that is, over-appointment of independent directors belongs to the “supervision mechanism”. The mechanism test shows that the over-appointment of independent directors promotes the environmental investment of enterprises by inhibiting the short-sightedness of management and the tunneling of major shareholders. Further analysis shows that in heavily polluting industries, two-in-one and low-paid independent directors, the over-appointment of independent directors has a more significant role in promoting corporate environmental investment. |
| keywords:over-appointment of independent directors short-sighted management large shareholders hollowed out enterprise environmental protection investment |
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