政府审计、官员政绩压力与地方债务风险—以H省原贫困地区为例
投稿时间:2021-10-19  修订日期:2022-03-03  点此下载全文
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作者单位邮编
王善平 湖南师范大学商学院 4100081
周钰 湖南师范大学商学院 410081
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目“新形势下长效治理精准产业扶贫异化的审计机制研究”(18AJY003);国家社会科学基金社团资助项目“稳定脱贫绩效的管理制度改进研究”(20STA058)
中文摘要:以政府审计是治理政府代理问题的免疫系统为理论基础,以2015-2018年H省原贫困地区政府债务数据为样本,实证检验官员政绩压力对地方债务风险的影响和政府审计对其的治理作用。研究发现:官员政绩压力与地方债务风险显著正相关,政府审计有助于抑制官员政绩压力对地方债务风险的影响,其揭示、预防功能作用显著,抵御功能不显著,可能的原因是地方官员的举债行为还没有得到有效控制。鉴此,提出构建“数智审计”、系统改进官员绩效考核制度和加强金融杠杆动态管理等政策建议。
中文关键词:地方政府债务风险  官员政绩压力  政府审计
 
Government audit, official performance pressure and local debt risk: A case study of the former poor areas in H Province
Abstract:Based on the theory that government audit is the immune system to govern government agency problems, and with the government debt data of former poor areas in H province from 2015 to 2018 as samples, this paper empirically examines the impact of official performance pressure on local debt risk and the governance role of government audit. The results show that: the performance pressure of officials is significantly positively correlated with local debt risk, and government audit can help restrain the impact of performance pressure of officials on local debt risk, and its function of revealing and preventing is significant, but its function of resisting is not significant, the possible reason is that the debt behavior of local officials has not been effectively controlled. In view of this, some policy suggestions are put forward, such as constructing "number-wise audit", systematically improving the performance appraisal system of officials and strengthening the dynamic management of financial leverage.
keywords:Local government debt risk  Official performance pressure  The government audit
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