基于演化博弈的社保基金征缴过程中“逃费”问题治理研究
投稿时间:2015-11-14  修订日期:2016-04-28  点此下载全文
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作者单位地址
江红莉* 江苏大学 江苏省镇江市学府路301号江苏大学
何建敏 东南大学 
姚洪兴 江苏大学 
中文摘要:社保基金的收支平衡直接影响社会稳定。在社保基金投资运营风险较大、支出难以减少的现实情况下,有效地管理社保基金征缴,尤其是治理征缴过程中的“逃费”现象,不失为解决社保基金收支平衡问题的有效途径。本文构建了社保基金管理部门与企业之间的演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的行为演化和策略动态调整过程。仿真分析发现:加大对企业逃费的惩罚力度、社保基金管理部门的奖惩力度以及降低社保基金管理部门的监管成本,系统收敛到良好模式的可能性变大、速度变快,有望完全进化到(认真监管,缴费)这一良好模式,能有效治理企业“逃费”问题。
中文关键词:演化博弈,社保基金,逃费,数值仿真
 
The research on how to governance the premium evasion phenomenon in the process of social security fund raising based on evolutionary game
Abstract:The social security fund balance of payments directly affects the social stability. Effectively managing the social security fund raising, especially governancing "escape" phenomenon in the process of raising, can yet be regarded as the effective way to solve the social security fund balance risk, in the environment of social security fund investment risk and spending difficult to reduce. This paper constructs the evolutionary game, considering the social security fund management departments and enterprises as two parties of game, analyses the behavior and strategy and their dynamic adjustment processes. The simulation results show that, intensifying the punishment of premium evasion, intensifying the rewards and punishment of the social security fund management departments, and reducing the regulatory costs, can promote the system converges to good mode more likely and faster,can be fully evolved to the good mode (serious regulation, pay cost),which means can effectively governance the premium evasion phenomenon.
keywords:evolutionary game  social security fund  premium evasion  numerical simulation
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