| 表现对高管薪酬激励机制的影响研究 |
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| 引用本文：贾巧玉1，周嘉南2，刘辰嫣3，刘智超1.表现对高管薪酬激励机制的影响研究[J].财经理论与实践,2026,(2):101-110 |
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| 中文摘要:采用2017—2022年A股上市公司数据，基于环境、社会和治理（ESG）投资的事前激励与事后约束双重视角，实证检验ESG表现对高管薪酬激励机制的影响。结果显示：较好的ESG表现能显著提高高管薪酬水平，表明企业通过将ESG与薪酬挂钩进行事前激励；同时，ESG表现显著增强高管薪酬业绩敏感性，表明企业通过强化业绩约束进行事后管理。进一步研究表明，该激励约束机制有助于提升企业ESG表现并抑制高管超额薪酬；当会计信息或ESG信息不对称程度较高时，企业会弱化激励并强化约束。异质性检验发现，重污染企业与国有企业呈现出强激励、弱约束的特征，行业竞争较大时，激励约束机制更强；高管持股比例较高或权力较大时，激励约束机制则较弱。鉴于此，企业应结合自身行业属性及治理特征构建差异化的ESG薪酬机制，推动ESG转型。 |
| 中文关键词:高管薪酬 ESG表现 薪酬业绩敏感性 信息不对称 超额薪酬 |
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| The Impact of ESG Performance on Executive Compensation Incentive Mechanisms |
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| Abstract:Based on the dual perspectives of ex-ante incentives and ex-post constraints in ESG investment, this study empirically examines the impact of ESG performance on executive compensation incentive mechanisms using data from A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2022. The results show that better ESG performance significantly increases executive compensations, confirming that firms implement ex-ante incentives by linking ESG to pay. At the same time, better ESG performance significantly enhances pay-for-performance sensitivity, demonstrating that firms conduct ex-post management through strengthened performance constraints. Further research indicates that this incentive-constraint mechanism can improve ESG performance and curb excessive executive compensation. When accounting information or ESG information asymmetry is high, firms tend to weaken incentives while strengthening constraints. Heterogeneity tests reveal that heavily polluting enterprises and state-owned enterprises exhibit strong incentives but weak constraints, while greater industry competition strengthens both incentive and constraint effects, and higher executive shareholding or greater executive power weakens the mechanism. Accordingly, companies should develop ESG-linked compensation mechanisms tailored to the Chinese context based on their own characteristics, so as to promote ESG transformation. |
| keywords:executive compensation ESG performance pay-for-performance sensitivity information asymmetry excessive compensation |
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