| 共同机构持股与股票市场操纵——“同舟共济”抑或“合谋舞弊” |
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| 引用本文：李志辉,李增杰.共同机构持股与股票市场操纵——“同舟共济”抑或“合谋舞弊”[J].财经理论与实践,2026,(2):51-60 |
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| 中文摘要:以2011—2021年我国A股上市公司为样本，系统考察共同机构持股对股票市场操纵的影响及作用机制。研究发现：共同机构持股通过强化信息披露质量、增强股票流动性显著抑制股票市场操纵行为；长期共同机构投资者的抑制效应优于短期机构，非压力敏感型共同机构持股的抑制作用显著而压力敏感型则不显著；机会主义动机驱动的共同机构持股，仍能抑制市场操纵，但抑制效应强度下降。鉴于此，需兼顾专业机构培育与股权网络构建，并重点引导机会主义持股资金向长期耐心资本转化，进而持续巩固对股票市场操纵的治理效能。 |
| 中文关键词:共同机构持股 股票市场操纵 信息披露 股票流动性 机会主义 |
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| Common Institutional Ownership and Stock Market Manipulation—“Solidarity” or “Collusion and Fraud” |
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| Abstract:Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as samples, this paper systematically examines the impact and mechanism of common institutional ownership on stock market manipulation. The findings reveal that common institutional ownership significantly curbs market manipulation by enhancing the quality of information disclosure and improving stock liquidity; the inhibitory effect of long-term common institutional investors is stronger than that of short-term ones, while the suppression effect of non-pressure-sensitive common institutional ownership is significant, whereas pressure-sensitive common ownership shows no significant effect. Although opportunistic-driven common institutional ownership still suppresses market manipulation, its inhibitory effect weakens. Given this, efforts should balance the cultivation of professional institutions and the construction of equity networks, with a focus on guiding opportunistic holdings toward long-term patient capital, thereby continuously reinforcing the governance effectiveness against stock market manipulation. |
| keywords:common institutional ownership stock market manipulation information disclosure stock liquidity opportunism |
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