| Abstract:Under the backdrop of population aging, the reform of social security collection institutions is an important measure to alleviate the contradiction between social security fund revenues and expenditures. However, it also impacts local economies and employment through cost transmission mechanisms, thereby affecting the behavioral preferences of local governments. In this regard, this paper systematically examines the impact of "social security tax collection" on local protectionism using the generalized difference-in-differences method based on panel data from prefecture-level cities from 2015 to 2019. The study finds that the "social security tax collection" policy significantly enhances local procurement preferences in government purchasing, indicating that it has to some extent stimulated local protectionist tendencies. The mechanism analysis reveals two main pathways: on the one hand, "social security tax collection" increases corporate compliance costs, reduces local investment attractiveness, and puts short-term pressure on the local economy; on the other hand, the policy accelerates the substitution of labor by machines, leading to rising unemployment rates, which impacts local employment and in turn prompts local governments to take protective measures. The heterogeneous analysis finds that in regions with a higher proportion of private and individual employment, higher fiscal self-sufficiency rate and greater pressure on officials' promotion, the promoting effect of "social security tax collection" on local procurement preferences in government purchasing is more significant. |