平台经济下非横向经营者集中的反垄断审查

曹汇

平台经济下非横向经营者集中的反垄断审查

引用本文：曹汇.平台经济下非横向经营者集中的反垄断审查[J].财经理论与实践,2025,(6):143-151

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作者	单位
曹汇	（上海社会科学院法学研究所，上海 200020）

中文摘要:非横向集中是一类重要的平台集中类型。其中的反竞争效应主要有三个：封锁效应、协调效应、杠杆效应。封锁效应分为原料封锁与客户封锁，平台经济下的特殊封锁行为体现为封禁，特殊原料则是数据。平台非横向集中会产生协调效应的原因在于平台生态系统的构建创造了多重市场接触的机会，这会强化协调效应。而且，平台经济的市场结构天然容易催生轴辐协议。平台非横向集中触发杠杆效应的典型表现则是自我优待。同时，隐私与数据也常常成为平台实施垄断杠杆行为的重要载体。

中文关键词:平台经营者集中控制非横向集中反垄断

Anti-Monopoly Review of Non-Horizontal Mergers in the Platform Economy

Abstract:Non-horizontal mergers are an important type of platform merger. There are three main anti-competitive effects: foreclosure effect, coordinated effect, and leverage effect. The foreclosure effect can be divided into input foreclosure and customer foreclosure. In the platform economy, special blocking behaviors manifest as bans, data becomes special raw material. The reason for the coordinated effect of non-horizontal merger in platforms is that the construction of the platform ecosystem creates multiple opportunities for market contact, which strengthens the coordinated effect. Moreover, the market structure of the platform economy is naturally prone to the birth of hub-and-spoke agreements. The typical manifestation of non-horizontal merger leverage effect in platforms is self-preferencing. At the same time, privacy and data often become important carriers for platforms to implement monopolistic leverage behavior.

keywords:platform merger control non-horizontal merger anti-monopoly

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