董事高管责任保险与权益资本成本——基于信息披露质量与高管风险偏好渠道

陈  华; 崔锦枫; 杨晓旭

董事高管责任保险与权益资本成本——基于信息披露质量与高管风险偏好渠道

引用本文：陈华，崔锦枫，杨晓旭.董事高管责任保险与权益资本成本——基于信息披露质量与高管风险偏好渠道[J].财经理论与实践,2023,(6):35-42

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作者	单位
陈华，崔锦枫，杨晓旭	（中央财经大学保险学院，北京 102206）

中文摘要:基于2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据，实证探究了公司购买董事高管责任保险的行为与其权益资本成本之间的关系。主检验相关结果显示，公司的权益资本成本将随着公司购买董责险行为的发生而降低。使用PSM和IV估计进行稳健性检验，排除样本选择性偏误等内生性问题的影响后结论依然成立。通过中介效应分析了董责险影响权益资本成本的作用路径，证实了信息披露质量是董责险影响权益资本成本的一种途径。异质性分析结果表明，严监管环境更有利于董责险“外部监管者”职能的发挥。

中文关键词:董事高管责任保险权益资本成本信息披露质量董事高管风险偏好

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Cost of Equity Capital—Based on Disclosure Quality and D&O Risk Preference Channels

Abstract:Based on data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2020, this study empirically explores the relationship between the purchase of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance by companies and their cost of equity capital. The main test results show that the company’s cost of equity capital will decrease as the company purchases D&O liability insurance. The conclusion is still valid after using PSM and IV estimation for robustness testing, excluding the influence of sample selectivity bias and endogeneity issues. By analyzing the mediating effect, this paper confirms that the disclosure quality is one of the ways in which D&O liability insurance affects the cost of equity capital. The results of heterogeneity analysis indicate that a strict regulatory environment is more conducive to the exercise of the external regulator function of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.

keywords:D&O liability insurance cost of equity capital disclosure quality D&O risk preference

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