地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚 ——来自环保督政制度的新证据

朱  锐; 刘梦婷

地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚 ——来自环保督政制度的新证据

引用本文：朱锐，刘梦婷.地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚 ——来自环保督政制度的新证据[J].财经理论与实践,2022,(4):129-137

摘要点击次数: 239

全文下载次数: 0

作者	单位
朱锐，刘梦婷	（长沙理工大学经济与管理学院，湖南长沙 410076）

中文摘要:基于新《环保法》的准自然实验，运用双重差分法和倾向得分匹配法，考量新法实施前后地方环境治理动机变化对企业环境违规处罚力度的影响。结果显示，新法实施前，政治关联对企业环境违规处罚力度具有“庇护”效应；新法实施后，“庇护”效应被削弱。其中，官员型政治关联和市场化水平较低地区的“庇护”效应削弱程度更大。结果表明，治理动机不足是以往环境治理失灵的重要成因。应着力完善正负激励互补的激励结构，强化地方政府环境治理动机。

中文关键词:环境规制政治关联环境违规处罚环保法准自然实验

Regional Environment Governance Motivation, Political Connection, and Corporate Environmental Violation Penalties: New Evidence from Environmental Supervision System

Abstract:Taking the new “Environmental Protection Law” in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment, using PSM-DID method, this paper empirically tests the impact of the new-law caused changes in local governance motivation on the corporate environmental violation’s penalties. We found that before the new law, political connections had a “sheltering” effect on the penalties. After the new law, such effect has been significantly reduced. Among them, enterprises with official political connections and low level of regional marketization are more severely punished.

keywords:environmental regulation political connection environmental violation penalty environmental protection law quasi-natural experiment

查看全文 查看/发表评论 下载pdf阅读器