财政层级改革、竞争效应与税收征管

刘建民1; 2; 刘晓函2; 吴金光3; 刘嘉意2

财政层级改革、竞争效应与税收征管

引用本文：刘建民1，2, 刘晓函2, 吴金光3 ,刘嘉意2.财政层级改革、竞争效应与税收征管[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(6):118-125

摘要点击次数: 298

全文下载次数: 0

作者	单位
刘建民1，2, 刘晓函2, 吴金光3 ,刘嘉意2	（1.长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙 410114； 2.湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙 410079； 3.湖南财政经济学院财政金融学院, 湖南长沙 410205）

中文摘要:以“省直管县”财政体制改革为准自然实验，运用双重差分模型，从企业实际税率的角度考量财政层级改革对县级政府税收征管行为的影响。结果显示：“省直管县”财政体制改革加剧了县级政府间的税收竞争，显著弱化了县级政府税收征管努力，降低了辖区内企业的实际税率，并且对于处于不同市场化水平和不同行业集中度的企业具有异质性影响。

中文关键词:财政层级改革省直管县税收征管竞争效应

Reform of Fiscal Hierarchy, Competition Effect and Tax Administration

Abstract:This paper takes the fiscal hierarchy reform of "province-managing-county" by local governments as a quasi-natural experiment. Based on the data of Chinese industrial enterprises, using the model of difference in difference, this paper studies the impact of fiscal hierarchy reform on the tax administration of county-level governments from the perspective of actual corporate tax rates. The results show that the PMC reform has intensified tax competition among county governments, significantly weakened the tax administration efforts of county governments, and lowered the actual tax rate of enterprises within their jurisdiction. For enterprises with different levels of marketization, and different industry concentrations, the impact of the PMC reform on county government tax administration behavior is significantly heterogeneous.

keywords:fiscal hierarchy reform province-managing-county tax enforcement competition effect

查看全文 查看/发表评论 下载pdf阅读器