| 不完全信息下基于风险偏好的生态系统服务付费契约设计 |
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| 引用本文：姜 珂1,2, 董 萱1, 袁广达1.不完全信息下基于风险偏好的生态系统服务付费契约设计[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(5):139-147 |
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| 中文摘要:基于信息经济学理论，考量生态系统服务付费投资方与供给方在不同风险偏好下的契约设计问题，结果显示：在完全信息条件下，投资方的可变补偿成本与治污成本参数和市场环境不确定性的变化呈负相关；在不完全信息条件下，投资方提供分离契约更利于实现自身期望收益最大化，而高技术类型的供给方则偏向于单一契约；生态系统服务付费双方期望收益与供给方的不同技术水平均呈正相关；在不同风险组合偏好下，高技术类型的供给方在面临分离契约时的努力水平总高于单一契约，低技术的供给方则相反；当双方均为风险中性时，投资方收益最高；而当双方均为风险规避时，投资方收益最低。 |
| 中文关键词:生态系统服务付费 不完全信息 风险偏好 契约设计 |
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| Contract Design of Payments for Ecosystem Services with Risk Preferences under Incomplete Information |
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| Abstract:Leveraging a theoretical foundation on the information economic theory, this study explores the contract design between investors and suppliers with different risk preferences in the market of payment for ecosystem services (PES). As indicated in the results, under the condition of complete information, the variable compensation cost that PES investors pay for suppliers is negatively correlated to the environmental pollution control cost and the uncertainty changes in the market. Under the conditions of incomplete information, investors are more conducive to provide the separate contract to maximize their expected returns, while high-tech PES suppliers prefer the single contract. The expected returns that both sides of PES can obtain is positively correlated to the technology degree of the suppliers. With the combination of various risk preferences, the effort degree of high-tech PES suppliers under separate contract is always higher than that of single contract, while that of low-tech suppliers is the opposite. The investors' returns are highest when both sides of PES are risk-neutral and lowest when they are risk-averse. |
| keywords:payments for ecosystem services incomplete information risk avoidance contract design |
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