信息不对称下订单农业合约设计
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引用本文:曹 裕, 陶 兰, 吴 堪.信息不对称下订单农业合约设计[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(4):97-103
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作者单位
曹 裕, 陶 兰, 吴 堪 (中南大学 商学院湖南 长沙 410083) 
中文摘要:基于绿色成本信息不对称,运用博弈方法,构建二级绿色订单农业供应链,考量订单农业合约设计。结果表明:信息不对称下,采用批发价合同,公司利润可能受损,当公司高估绿色成本时,农户获利;采用收益分享合同,公司利润可能受损,但有利农户。无论信息是否对称,当农户的保留收益、绿色努力成本系数或产出不确定性较小时,公司宜选择收益分享合同;反之,宜选择批发价合同。与批发价合同相比,菜单合同可以降低信息不对称性和供应链的“双边际”效应,激励农户增加绿色投入,促进优质绿色农产品供给和各主体增收。
中文关键词:订单农业  信息不对称  绿色努力  批发价合同  菜单合同
 
Contract Design for Contract Farming Under Information Asymmetry
Abstract:Based on the greening cost information asymmetry and using the game method, this paper constructs a secondary green contract farming supply chain and designs contracts for contract farming. The results show that under asymmetric information, the wholesale price contract may damage the company's profits, but benefit the farmer when the company overestimates the greening costs; the revenue sharing contract may also damage the company's profits but is beneficial to the farmer. Regardless of whether the information is symmetric or asymmetric, the company should choose the revenue sharing contract when the farmer's retained earnings, the farmer's greening effort's cost coefficient, or the output uncertainty is small; otherwise, it should choose the wholesale price contract. Compared with the wholesale price contract, the menu contract can reduce information asymmetry and the "bilateral" effect of the supply chain, encourage the farmer to increase greening input, promote the supply of high-quality green agricultural products and increase the income of all entities.
keywords:contract farming  information asymmetry  greening effort  wholesale price contract  menu contract
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