超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费

赵   彦   锋

超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费

引用本文：赵彦锋.超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(1):62-69

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作者	单位
赵彦锋	（河南财经政法大学电子商务学院，河南郑州 450046）

中文摘要:基于2011-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本，实证检验超额商誉对审计收费的影响以及高管激励的调节效应。研究表明：超额商誉提高了审计收费，且在民营企业更显著；而高管不同激励方式对超额商誉与审计收费的调节具有异质性：股权激励具有抑制作用，而薪酬激励具有增强效应；从作用机制来看，超额商誉通过增加经营风险和审计投入，进而提高审计收费。

中文关键词:超额商誉经营风险审计投入高管激励审计收费

Excess Goodwill, Executive Incentive and Audit Fees

Abstract:Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018 as samples, this paper empirically tests the impact of excess goodwill on audit fees. The findings are as follows:the excess goodwill increases audit fees and this effect is more significant in private enterprises; different executive incentive methods have different adjustment directions for the relationship between excess goodwill and audit fees: the equity incentive has inhibitory effect, while the compensation incentive has enhancement effect; from the perspective of mechanism, excess goodwill increases operational risk, and auditors need to increase input, which further affects audit fees.

keywords:excess goodwill operational risk audit investment executive incentive audit fees

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