超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费
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引用本文:赵 彦 锋.超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(1):62-69
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作者单位
赵 彦 锋 (河南财经政法大学 电子商务学院河南 郑州 450046) 
中文摘要:基于2011-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验超额商誉对审计收费的影响以及高管激励的调节效应。研究表明:超额商誉提高了审计收费,且在民营企业更显著;而高管不同激励方式对超额商誉与审计收费的调节具有异质性:股权激励具有抑制作用,而薪酬激励具有增强效应;从作用机制来看,超额商誉通过增加经营风险和审计投入,进而提高审计收费。
中文关键词:超额商誉  经营风险  审计投入  高管激励  审计收费
 
Excess Goodwill, Executive Incentive and Audit Fees
Abstract:Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018 as samples, this paper empirically tests the impact of excess goodwill on audit fees. The findings are as follows:the excess goodwill increases audit fees and this effect is more significant in private enterprises; different executive incentive methods have different adjustment directions for the relationship between excess goodwill and audit fees: the equity incentive has inhibitory effect, while the compensation incentive has enhancement effect; from the perspective of mechanism, excess goodwill increases operational risk, and auditors need to increase input, which further affects audit fees.
keywords:excess goodwill  operational risk  audit investment  executive incentive  audit fees
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