交易所问询与企业过度投资——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据
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引用本文:聂 萍,徐 筱.交易所问询与企业过度投资——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(1):48-54
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作者单位
聂 萍,徐 筱 (湖南大学 工商管理学院,湖南 长沙 410082) 
中文摘要:基于证券交易所问询函件频发以及重点关注企业投资行为的背景,采用2015-2018年A股上市公司年报及其年报问询函数据,探讨交易所年报问询函对企业过度投资的影响效力。研究发现:年报问询函监管能够在一定程度上抑制公司的过度投资;且当上市公司收到的问询函中涉及“投资”事项问题时,对公司过度投资的抑制作用更明显;管理层权力对问询函监管与过度投资关系具有调节作用。
中文关键词:问询函监管  过度投资  管理层权力  信息披露
 
Inquiry Letter Supervision and Corporate Over-investment: Empirical Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of Annual Report Inquiry
Abstract:Based on frequent circulars of inquiry letters and focus on the enterprise's investment behavior, this paper adopts the A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2018 as samples to investigate the effect of inquiry letters supervision on corporate over-investment. The study shows that the annual report inquiry letter supervision inhibit the over-investment behavior of the company. And when the inquiry letter involves the issue of "investment", the inhibitive effect on the over-investment of the company is more obvious. Management power has a moderating effect on the relationship between inquiry regulation and over-investment.
keywords:inquiry letter supervision  over-investment  management power  information disclosure
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