交易所问询与企业过度投资——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据

聂   萍; 徐   筱

交易所问询与企业过度投资——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据

引用本文：聂萍,徐筱.交易所问询与企业过度投资——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2021,(1):48-54

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作者	单位
聂萍,徐筱	（湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙 410082）

中文摘要:基于证券交易所问询函件频发以及重点关注企业投资行为的背景，采用2015-2018年A股上市公司年报及其年报问询函数据，探讨交易所年报问询函对企业过度投资的影响效力。研究发现：年报问询函监管能够在一定程度上抑制公司的过度投资；且当上市公司收到的问询函中涉及“投资”事项问题时，对公司过度投资的抑制作用更明显；管理层权力对问询函监管与过度投资关系具有调节作用。

中文关键词:问询函监管过度投资管理层权力信息披露

Inquiry Letter Supervision and Corporate Over-investment: Empirical Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of Annual Report Inquiry

Abstract:Based on frequent circulars of inquiry letters and focus on the enterprise's investment behavior, this paper adopts the A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2018 as samples to investigate the effect of inquiry letters supervision on corporate over-investment. The study shows that the annual report inquiry letter supervision inhibit the over-investment behavior of the company. And when the inquiry letter involves the issue of "investment", the inhibitive effect on the over-investment of the company is more obvious. Management power has a moderating effect on the relationship between inquiry regulation and over-investment.

keywords:inquiry letter supervision over-investment management power information disclosure

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