| 两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究 |
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| 引用本文：曹 裕，汪小炼，吴 堪.两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究[J].财经理论与实践,2020,(6):126-132 |
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| 中文摘要:运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型，研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下，在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时，制造商不会开通直销渠道，否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道；再制造情形下，在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道，但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道，否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道；无论是否进行再制造，制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润，但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益，且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。 |
| 中文关键词:两阶段供应链 回收再制造 渠道入侵 |
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| Research on Channel Intrusion and Recovery Strategy of Manufacturers in Two-stage Supply Chain |
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| Abstract:Using the game method, construct a two-stage supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and study the intrusion strategy and timing of the manufacturer's direct sales channel with or without remanufacturing. The results show that in the case of no remanufacturing, when channel competition is weak and the invasion will divide the market equally, manufacturers will not open direct sales channels, otherwise they will choose to open direct sales channels in the first stage; in the case of remanufacturing, channel competition is weak And when the invasion will divide the market equally, manufacturers will not open direct sales channels, but when competition is weak and retail channels account for a large proportion of them, they will choose to open direct sales channels in the second phase, otherwise they will open direct sales channels in the first phase; Remanufacturing and manufacturer's channel invasion may harm retailers' profits. However, when competition is strong and retail channels account for a large proportion of retail channels, channel intrusion can benefit both manufacturers and retailers. The probability of winning is greater. |
| keywords:two-stage supply chain recycling and remanufacturing channel invasion |
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