官员晋升压力会增加国有企业股价崩盘风险吗?
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引用本文:李健欣1,蒋华林1,施 赟2.官员晋升压力会增加国有企业股价崩盘风险吗?[J].财经理论与实践,2020,(6):51-56
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作者单位
李健欣1,蒋华林1,施 赟2 (1.广东金融学院 经济贸易学院广东 广州 5105212.广东财经大学 会计学院广东 广州 510320) 
中文摘要:以2007-2016年我国A股国有上市公司为样本,考察官员晋升压力对国有企业股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现:官员晋升压力加剧了国有企业的股价崩盘风险,尤其是在政府干预程度较大的地区;进一步作用机制检验显示,官员晋升压力是通过国有企业管理层隐藏负面消息、增加过度投资以及降低环境治理水平而加剧股价崩盘风险的。本文的研究丰富了股价崩盘风险影响因素的理论成果,进一步揭示了官员晋升压力对微观企业的干预作用,并为地方官员晋升考核机制的完善提供了政策启示。
中文关键词:官员晋升压力  股价崩盘风险  过度投资  环境治理水平
 
Does Official Promotion Pressure Exacerbate State-owned Enterprises' Crash Risk?
Abstract:Using the sample of non-financial state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2016, this paper examines the impact of official promotion pressure on state-owned enterprises' stock price crash risk. The results show that: the pressure of official promotion exacerbates the stock price crash risk of state-owned enterprises in this region, especially in the areas where government intervention is relatively large; further test of mechanism shows that official promotion pressure exacerbates the stock price crash risk through hiding negative news of state-owned companies management, increasing excessive investment and reducing the level of environmental governance. Our research enriches the theoretical results of influencing factors of stock price crash risk, further reveals the intervention effect of official promotion pressure on micro enterprises, and provides policy enlightenment for the improvement of local officials' promotion assessment mechanism.
keywords:official promotion pressure  stock price crash risk  overinvestment  environmental governance level
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