终极控制股东、金字塔结构与会计稳健性
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引用本文:韩克勇1,王 慧2.终极控制股东、金字塔结构与会计稳健性[J].财经理论与实践,2020,(1):63-70
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韩克勇1,王 慧2 (1.山西省社会科学院,山西 太原 030032 2.北京联合大学 商务学院北京 100025) 
中文摘要:我国股权大都集中在大股东的手中,终极控制股东普遍采用金字塔股权结构的方式对底层公司实施控制并影响会计稳健性。基于Basu模型,采用2012-2017年深沪两市A股上市公司数据,对终极控制股东产权性质、金字塔股权结构对上市公司会计稳健性进行研究。结果表明:与终极控制股东为非国有的上市公司相比,终极控制股东为国有的上市公司会计稳健性更高;金字塔层级增加导致会计稳健性降低;金字塔层级的增加对于国有控股企业和非国有控股企业会计稳健性的影响存在差异,国有终极控制上市公司的会计稳健性更高。
中文关键词:会计稳健性  终极控制股东  金字塔股权结构  Basu模型
 
The Ultimate Control Shareholder's Nature of Property, Pyramid Equity Structure and Accounting Robustness
Abstract:In our country, stock equities are almost controlled by ultimate controlling shareholders. Ultimate controlling shareholders generally use Pyramid shareholding structure to control the bottom-of-the-pyramid companies and to impact the accounting conservatism. This paper uses the data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2012 to 2017, based on the Basu model to study the property rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the pyramid ownership structure to study the accounting robustness of listed companies. The final research results show that: (1) compared with the ultimate controlling shareholder's non-state-owned listed company, the ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned listed company with higher accounting stability; (2) increasing the pyramid level leads to lower accounting robustness; (3) the increase in the pyramid level has different effects on the accounting conservatism of state-owned holding companies and non-state-owned holding companies. The state-owned ultimate control of listed companies has higher accounting stability.
keywords:accounting conservatism  ultimate controlling shareholder  pyramid shareholding structure  Basu model
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