二级供应链中企业社会责任行为的博弈研究
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引用本文:马跃如,周默亭,曹 裕.二级供应链中企业社会责任行为的博弈研究[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(4):130-136
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马跃如,周默亭,曹 裕 (中南大学 商学院湖南 长沙 410083) 
中文摘要:采用博弈方法,考量二级供应链中生产环节的CSR投入决策及关键影响因素。结果显示:与一般供应链相比,CSR的投入可以在基本保持原有销售价格的基础上获得更高的利润;若只有上游企业承担社会责任成本,下游企业极易产生“搭便车”行为;讨价还价契约可以一定程度上减少“搭便车”行为,进一步提高供应链利润。算例分析发现,随下游企业讨价还价能力的提升,供应链CSR的投入减少,下游企业利润增加,但供应链总利润的影响呈倒“U”型;而CSR成本系数及需求对价格的敏感程度对CSR的投入及供应链利润均产生负向影响。
中文关键词:企业社会责任  讨价还价契约  成本分担  博弈分析
 
Research on the Game Model of Socially Responsible Conduct in two-echelon Supply Chains
Abstract:Using game method to explore the CSR input decision and key influencing factors in the secondary supply chain. The results show that: compared with the general supply chain, CSR can achieve higher profit on the basis of maintaining the original sales price; if only upstream enterprises bear the cost of social responsibility, downstream enterprises are prone to “hitchhiking” behavior. Bargaining contracts can reduce hitchhiking to a certain extent and further increase supply chain profits. Further, with the improvement of bargaining power of downstream enterprises, the input of CSR in supply chain decreases and the profit of downstream enterprises increases, but the influence of total profit of supply chain is an inverted “U” type. However, the sensitivity of CSR cost coefficient and demand to price has a negative effect on the input of CSR and the profit of supply chain.
keywords:Corporate social responsibility  Bargaining contract  Cost sharing  Game analysis
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