CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系、内部控制质量与代理成本
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引用本文:张 十 根.CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系、内部控制质量与代理成本[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(4):88-94
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作者单位
张 十 根 (江西财经大学 会计学院江西 南昌 330013) 
中文摘要:以2000-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系、内部控制质量对代理成本的影响,研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系能显著降低代理成本;随着公司内部控制质量的提高,CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系对代理成本的降低程度越来越低。进一步研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系只在非国有企业、CEO为男性的样本中能显著降低代理成本。
中文关键词:代理成本  “老乡”关系  内部控制质量  公司治理
 
Hometown Connectedness Between the CEO and the Board of Directors, the Quality of Internal Control and Agency Cost
Abstract:Based on samples from China's listed companies (2000-2015) to test the relevance between hometown connectedness between the CEO and the board of directors, the quality of internal control and agency cost, it can be found that: hometown connectedness between the CEO and board of directors can significantly reduce agency cost; with the improvement of the quality of internal control, hometown connectedness between the CEO and board of directors would play a weaker role in reducing agency cost. Further results found that: there is significantly negative relevance between hometown connectedness between the CEO and the board of directors and agency cost only when the listed companies are non-state-owned listed companies, the gender of CEO is male.
keywords:Agency cost  Hometown connectedness  Quality of internal control  Corporate governance
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