| 高管团队激励分散度、企业风险承担与战略绩效研究 |
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| 引用本文：王晓亮1，蒋 勇2.高管团队激励分散度、企业风险承担与战略绩效研究[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(2):106-111 |
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| 中文摘要:代理问题的存在会导致管理者“短视”，出于私利，管理者往往不愿意承担风险，这虽然会给企业带来短期经济利益，但也会给未来发展埋下隐患。为解决此类代理问题，高管团队成员激励将发挥关键作用。因此，研究高管团队激励对企业绩效影响，高管薪酬激励对企业风险承担影响以及企业风险承担对企业绩效影响，对于中国企业的激励契约设计、经济增长和潜在风险认识均具有重要实践意义。 |
| 中文关键词:高管团队激励 风险承担 战略绩效 |
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| Research on Dispersion of Management Team Incentive, Corporate Risk-taking and Strategic performance: A Literature Review |
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| Abstract:The presence of agency problems leads to managers "short-sightedness". Self-interest managers are often unwilling to take risks. Although this will bring short-term economic benefits to the enterprise，but also hide risks for the future development. To solve the problem of such agents, executive team member incentives will play a key role. This paper reviews the literature on the impact of executive team incentive on enterprise performance, the impact of executive compensation incentive on enterprise risk-taking and the impact of enterprise risk-taking on enterprise performance. On this basis, it is considered that the evaluation index of enterprise strategy should be evaluated, and constructed a research framework for the influence of executive team incentives on corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, analyzing the incentive dispersion of executive teams, the mechanism of corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, and moderating role of enterprise life cycle, industry characteristics, property rights nature, R&D density, geographical distribution and team cooperation time. This is of great practical significance to the design of incentive contracts, economic growth and potential risks of Chinese enterprises. |
| keywords:executive team incentives risk exposure strategic performance |
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