监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量
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引用本文:马 影,王 满,马 勇,于浩洋.监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(2):83-90
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作者单位
马 影,王 满,马 勇,于浩洋 (东北财经大学 会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心辽宁 大连 116025) 
中文摘要:中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现:相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。
中文关键词:多个大股东  内部控制  监督  双重治理效应
 
Supervision or Collusion: Multiple Large Shareholders and Internal Control Quality
Abstract:The shareholding ratio of blockholders in China's listed companies is relatively high, and there may be conspiracy tunneling or supervision checks among different blockholders. Using the sample of A-share firms from 2008 to 2016, this paper empirically tests the effect of multiple blockholders on the quality of corporate internal control. Results show that, firstly, firms with multiple blockholders are associated with higher quality of corporate internal control compared with single blockholder firms; secondly, the quality of the internal control increases with the number of the blockholders, the power of the non-controlling blockholders, and decreases with the equity deviation between the blockholders; thirdly, the existence of state-owned enterprise blockholders and foreign blockholders improve the quality of internal control significantly; finally, the governance effect of the large shareholders are more obvious in the non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with good information environment and in areas with higher degree of legal and market development.
keywords:multiple blockholders  internal control  supervision effect  dual corporate governance effect
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