融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制

洪 昀; 李婷婷; 姚靠华

融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制

引用本文：洪昀，李婷婷,姚靠华.融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制[J].财经理论与实践,2018,(4):67-72

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作者	单位
洪昀，李婷婷,姚靠华	（湖南大学工商管理学院，湖南长沙 410082）

中文摘要:采用2010-2016年沪深两市A股上市公司数据，考察融资融券机制、终极控制人两权分离对大股东掏空行为的影响。研究发现：两权分离度越高，大股东掏空越严重。而融资融券抑制了终极控制人两权分离引起的大股东掏空。进一步分析发现：在投资者保护环境更差、信息披露质量较低、内部治理机制更差的公司中，融资融券的掏空治理效应更加明显。

中文关键词:融资融券两权分离掏空

Margin Trading, Separation of Two Rights and Restrain of Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders

Abstract:Using the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during 2010-2016, we exam the impact of the margin trading and the separation of two right control and ownership right control and ownership right of ultimate controller on the tunneling behavior. The results show that margin trading refrain the tunneling behavior arising from the separation of two rights of ultimate controller, and this governance effect is more pronounced for firms from regions with worse investor protection environment, for firms with lower information disclosure quality and weaker corporate governance.

keywords:margin trading separation of control and ownership tunneling

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