股权制衡、非国有股东委派董事与公司绩效

谢海洋; 曹少鹏; 秦颖超

股权制衡、非国有股东委派董事与公司绩效

引用本文：谢海洋，曹少鹏，秦颖超.股权制衡、非国有股东委派董事与公司绩效[J].财经理论与实践,2018,(3):76-82

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作者	单位
谢海洋，曹少鹏，秦颖超	（郑州航空工业管理学院会计与财务研究中心，河南郑州 450046）

中文摘要:从公司治理层面完善国有控股企业的股权制衡是国企混合所有制改革的重点和难点，以往学者仅仅研究了股权制衡与公司绩效之间的关系，很少研究两者关系的作用路径和影响机理。因此，引入非国有股东委派董事这一概念，研究非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效之间发挥的中介效应。结果表明：股权制衡有利于公司绩效的提升，非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效两者之间发挥了中介效应。

中文关键词:混合所有制改革股权制衡非国有股东委派董事公司绩效

Balance Mechanism of Shareholding, Directors Appointed by Non-state Shareholders and Corporate Performance

Abstract:The balance of stockholder structure is the key of mixed ownership reform of state-owned corporations, and it is also difficult to achieve. Related former studies mainly focuses on the relationship between balance mechanism of shareholding and corporate performance, and few analyses are conducted on the path and mechanism of how these two concepts are interacted. To cope with this question, the concept of director appointed by non-state shareholders are introduced, and its mediating effect between balance mechanism of shareholding and corporate performance are analyzed in this paper. The research shows that balance of stockholder structure contributes to the improvement of corporate performance; director appointed by non-state shareholders exert mediating effect between balance mechanism of shareholding and corporate performance.

keywords:mixed ownership reform balance mechanism of shareholding directors appointed by non-state shareholders corporate performance

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