新型城镇化背景下城市房屋征收补偿的演化博弈模型
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引用本文:曹昭煜1,2,洪开荣1.新型城镇化背景下城市房屋征收补偿的演化博弈模型[J].财经理论与实践,2017,(4):127-132
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曹昭煜1,2,洪开荣1 (1.中南大学 商学院湖南 长沙 410083 2.湖南财政经济学院湖南 长沙 410205) 
中文摘要:城市房屋征收补偿的研究,均建立在完全理性、最优策略等传统的博弈理论基础之上,现实当中由于征收人(政府)与被征收人都是有限理性的,因此传统研究不符合城市房屋征收过程中的实际情况,更不利于城市房屋征收补偿机制的优化及改善。为了使城市房屋征收补偿问题更趋于公平和更贴合实际,本文运用演化博弈的思维,分析有限理性约束和初始条件约束下的演化稳定策略均衡,基于城市房屋征收补偿这个长期反复的博弈过程,研究博弈双方(征收人与被征收人)的策略调整、趋势以及局部稳定性。为了使得征收人(政府)与被征收人实现利益均衡,提出了改变和增加城市房屋征收补偿方式等建议。
中文关键词:城市房屋征收补偿  演化博弈  公平偏好
 
Evolutionary Game Model of Urban Housing Requisition Compensation under the Background of New Urbanization
Abstract:A study of urban housing requisition compensation is made based on the traditional game theory of complete rationality and optimal strategy. Traditional research does not conform to the actual situation in the process of urban housing requisition because of bounded rationality of the expropriator (government) and the expropriated, and it is not conducive to the optimization and improvement of urban housing requisition compensation mechanism. In order to make the urban housing requisition compensation fairer and more practical, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium under the constraints of bounded rationality and initial conditions. And it studies strategy adjustment, trend and local stability of the expropriator and the expropriated based on the long term repeated game process of urban housing requisition compensation. This paper makes suggestions on chaging and increasing ways of urban housing requisition compensation in order to achieve the balance of interests between the expropriator (government) and the expropriated.
keywords:urban housing requisition compensation  evolutionary game  fair play preference
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