控股股东担保、债务融资与资金侵占

李世辉1; 林 勇1; 贺 勇2; 曾辉祥1

控股股东担保、债务融资与资金侵占

引用本文：李世辉1，林勇1，贺勇2，曾辉祥1.控股股东担保、债务融资与资金侵占[J].财经理论与实践,2017,(4):77-82

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作者	单位
李世辉1，林勇1，贺勇2，曾辉祥1	（1.中南大学商学院，湖南长沙 410083； 2.湖南商学院经济学院,湖南长沙 410205）

中文摘要:以控股股东担保为切入点，在考虑担保的连带责任风险的基础上，构建控股股东通过担保进行资金侵占的理论模型，并以2010—2014年上证A股上市公司为样本进行实证研究。研究显示：控股股东对上市公司担保显著提高了上市公司债务规模，并通过债务融资加大了资金侵占程度；现金流权在担保对债务规模和资金侵占程度影响中具有正向的调节作用，表现为控股股东向较高现金流权公司提供了更多的担保债务从而进行资金侵占。

中文关键词:控股股东担保债务规模资金侵占现金流权

Controlling Shareholders’ Guarantee，Debt Financing and Capital Occupation

Abstract:This paper innovatively regards controlling shareholders’ guarantee as the point cut，and based on the consideration of guarantee of joint liability risk builds the theoretic model of controlling shareholders’ embezzlement by the guarantee，which is tested by an empirical study taking the listed companies between 2010 to 2014 in shanghai A shares as the sample.The results indicate that controlling shareholders significantly increase the debt scale of listed companies as well as the degree of capital occupation by debt financing. Different from previous studies，this paper shows that cash flow right positively modulates the guarantee’s effects on debt scale and capital occupation，that is，the controlling shareholder's encroachment of capital provides more guaranteed debt for those listed companies who own more cash flow rights.

keywords:controlling shareholders’ guarantee debt scale capital occupation cash flow rights

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