基于碳税下的供应链碳减排融资决策研究

杨 宽; 吴亭亭; 刘信钰

基于碳税下的供应链碳减排融资决策研究

引用本文：杨宽，吴亭亭，刘信钰.基于碳税下的供应链碳减排融资决策研究[J].财经理论与实践,2017,(4):21-27

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作者	单位
杨宽，吴亭亭，刘信钰	（湖南大学工商管理学院，湖南长沙 410082）

中文摘要:全球变暖日益加剧，为实现低碳理念，政府根据碳排放量征收碳税。为响应国家的低碳号召与节省缴税，供应商将进行碳减排投资，而我国中小企业居多的现状使得其必须进行碳减排融资。针对供应商向零售商进行内部融资的情形，在分散决策和集中决策下，运用两阶段Stackelberg博弈理论，根据供应链利润最大化条件进行优化。结果表明：分散决策下，低碳税率和供应商超额收益率的升高以及零售商净机会成本率的降低均会导致供应链总利润升高，单位碳减排量成本的升高会导致供应链总利润的降低，且集中决策的供应链总利润高于分散决策。

中文关键词:融资 Stackelberg 博弈理论碳税碳减排投资

Low Carbon Supply Chain Finance Decision Based on Carbon Tax

Abstract:Because of global warming,governments levy the carbon tax based on carbon emissions.Accordingly, in order to answer to the call of the country and save carbon tax, low carbon investment will be operated by the supplier. Due to the the majority of SMEs in China, they require financing to support the investment. In this paper, we will use the two stage Stackelberggame theory,considering that retailers provide internal financing for suppliers, to get the optimal solution for the profit maximization. The results in decentralized supply chain show that the increase of carbon tax and suppliers excess return rate, and the reduction of the net opportunity cost rate will result in the increase of total supply chain profit, while the rise of the per unit of carbon emission reduction cost will decrease the profit.The profit in a centralized supply chain is higher than that in a decentralized supply chain.

keywords:financing stackelberg game theory carbon tax carbon abatement investment

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