公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

胡国柳; 赵阳

公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

引用本文：胡国柳，赵阳.公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理[J].财经理论与实践,2017,(2):74-80

摘要点击次数: 729

全文下载次数: 0

作者	单位
胡国柳，赵阳	（海南大学经济与管理学院，海南海口570228）

中文摘要:董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应，降低了董事高管的执业风险。选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本，实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响，进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下，董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异。研究结果表明：董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为；随着公司治理水平提高，董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱。

中文关键词:公司治理董事高管责任保险盈余管理

Corporate Governance, Directors &Officers Liability Insurance and Earnings Management

Abstract:Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) will exert a "fallback" effect for the directors and executives in civil litigation, reduce the risk of the executive director. We choose 2002-2014 China A-share listed companies as samples to investigate the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management and further analyze the relationship between earnings management. The results show that the D&O insurance will aggravate the introduction of earnings management behavior; at the different corporate governance level, it can weaken the positive correlation between earnings management and D&O insurance.

keywords:corporate governance liability insurance earnings management

查看全文 查看/发表评论 下载pdf阅读器