财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据

谢盛纹; 廖佳

财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据

引用本文：谢盛纹,廖佳.财务重述、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险：来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2017,(1):80-87

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作者	单位
谢盛纹,廖佳	（1.江西财经大学会计发展研究中心,江西南昌330013；2.江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013）

中文摘要:股市震荡引发投资者和监管层对股价崩盘风险的关注。从财务重述背后所反映的财务信息质量低下和公司治理失效出发，探讨其对股价崩盘风险的影响，结合管理层权力这一影响组织行为和产出能力的代理人特征，探讨其对财务重述与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。研究结果表明：相比未发生财务重述的公司，发生了财务重述的公司的股价崩盘风险明显更高；进一步纳入代理人特征——管理层权力后，发现代理人的这一特征对上述关系有明显的促进作用。

中文关键词:财务重述信息隐藏信息透明度信息不对称管理层权力股价崩盘风险

Financial Restatements，Managerial Power and Stock Price Crash Risk：Evidence from Chinese Security Markets

Abstract:Stock market volatility led investors and regulators to be concerned about the stock price crash risk. From the view of financial restatements which reflect the low quality of financial information and corporate governance failures, we discuss its impact on the stock price crash risk. Combined with the managerial power which is one of the features of the agent that can affect the organizational behavior and output capacity, we explore its effect on the relationship between financial restatements and stock price crash risk. Our empirical research suggests that, compared to the company which the financial restatement did not occur, the company which restates its financial reports faces a greater risk of the stock price crash; with including the agent feature--managerial power, the results indicate that this feature of the agent plays a significant role in promoting the above-mentioned relationship.

keywords:financial restatements information hiding information transparency information asymmetry managerial power stock price crash risk

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