高管声誉激励契约的强度、效用及作用途径——一个中国情境下的实证检验
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引用本文:王帅, 徐宁,姜楠楠.高管声誉激励契约的强度、效用及作用途径——一个中国情境下的实证检验[J].财经理论与实践,2016,(3):69-76
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作者单位
王帅, 徐宁,姜楠楠 (山东大学 管理学院山东 济南250100) 
中文摘要:通过对部分高管进行访谈,并运用中国上市公司2007~2013年的平衡面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明:高管声誉激励强度与公司规模显著正相关,高管人力资本在两者之间具有中介作用;声誉激励通过与显性激励的交互效应从而对公司绩效产生间接的效用,具体而言,声誉激励与薪酬激励之间存在互补效应,与股权激励之间存在互替效应;产权性质能够对高管声誉激励效用产生显著的影响。
中文关键词:高管声誉激励  效用  作用途径  交互效应
 
Intensity,Effectiveness and Mechanism of Executive Reputation Incentive Contract:An Empirical Study in the Chinese Context
Abstract:we do a study on the intensity, effectiveness and mechanism of the executive reputation incentive contract in the Chinese Context by an integrated method of quantitative and qualitative research. First we choose some executives to do an in-depth interview, and then do the empirical study using the panel data of listed companies during 2007~2013 in China. The results show: the corporate size has a positive effect on executives' reputation with executives' human capital value as a mediator; the reputation incentive contract has an indirect effect on corporate performance, more specifically, there is a complementary effect between reputation incentive and compensation incentive, and there is a substitution effect between reputation incentive and equity incentive; ownership nature has an obvious effect on the effectiveness of the executive reputation incentive contract.
keywords:Executive reputation incentive  Effectiveness  Mechanism  Interaction effect
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