制度背景、在职消费与企业绩效——来自证券市场的经验证据
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引用本文:吴成颂,唐伟正,钱春丽.制度背景、在职消费与企业绩效——来自证券市场的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2015,(5):62-69
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作者单位
吴成颂,唐伟正,钱春丽 (安徽大学 商学院, 安徽 合肥230601) 
中文摘要:以2008~2013年沪市A股制造业为样本,通过将在职消费划分成正常、超额两部分,研究发现:以薪酬管制、冗员负担为代表的制度背景与上市公司高管超额在职消费显著正相关。并且,高管超额在职消费会显著损害企业绩效,而正常在职消费则能显著提升公司业绩,证明调和在职消费两种理论的关键在于一个合理的“度”。进一步研究发现,当前约束中国上市公司高管攫取超额在职消费的力量主要来自公司内部治理以及外在政治因素,市场化程度的提高并未能产生明显的作用。
中文关键词:薪酬管制  冗员负担  正常在职消费  超额在职消费  企业绩效
 
Institutional Background, Perks and Company Performance——The Evidence from Stock Market
Abstract:Using the data of Shanghai A-share listed companies in manufacturing from 2008 to 2013, and dividing perks into normal parts and excess parts, this study found: the compensation regulation system and labor redundancy have significant positive correlation with senior manager's excess perks. Besides, excess perks will significantly impair company's performance, while normal perks is able to significantly improve the performance of the company, this means the key point of connecting perks' agency theory and efficiency theory is a reasonable "degree". Through further study, we also found that currently the binding power of senior manager's excess perks mainly come from the company's internal governance and external political factors, the degree of marketization failed to produce a significant effect.
keywords:Compensation regulation  Labor redundancy  Normal perks  Excess perks  Company performance
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