环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计

关华; 齐卫娜

环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计

引用本文：关华，齐卫娜.环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计[J].财经理论与实践,2015,(1):100-104

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作者	单位
关华，齐卫娜	（1.天津大学管理与经济学部，天津300072；2.河北经贸大学工商管理学院，河北石家庄050061）

中文摘要:在环境治理中，中央政府和地方政府作为“经济人”为争取自身利益最大化展开竞争博弈，效用目标差异是导致其竞争的根本原因。为实现双方互利共赢的帕累托最优，应设计相应的激励机制以实现地方政府从竞争走向合作，实现地方利益与区域利益的统一，经济增长和环境协调一致，促进社会可持续发展。

中文关键词:环境治理利益博弈机制设计

The Game of Interest Between the Government and the Mechanism Design in Environmental Governance

Abstract:In environmental governance，the central government and the local government acted as an "economic man" for the maximization of their own interests to compete in the game. Utility goal difference is the fundamental cause of its competition. In order to achieve a win-win as the Pareto optimum, we design a corresponding incentive mechanism to realize the local government from competition to cooperation, the unity of local interests and regional interests, coordination of economic growth and the environment, and promote the sustainable development of society.

keywords:Environmental governance Game of interest Mechanism design

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