管理层权力、产权性质与股权激励契约设计 |
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引用本文:吴作凤.管理层权力、产权性质与股权激励契约设计[J].财经理论与实践,2014,(6):53-58 |
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中文摘要:以中国上市公司2006~2012年公告的股权激励计划为研究对象,运用主成分分析法合成管理层权力的综合变量,研究管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响,结果发现:管理层权力越大,股权激励强度越高,激励契约中设定较长有效期的概率越低;相比非国有公司,国有公司的管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响力显著更强。 |
中文关键词:管理层权力 产权性质 股权激励 契约设计 |
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Managerial Power, Nature of Property Right and Contract Design of Equity Incentive |
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Abstract:This paper investigates the contracts of equity incentive announced in 2006~2012 using data from the Chinese market, synthesizes managerial power variable using the PCA method,and analyzes the influence of managerial power on the contract design. This study shows that:(1) the more powerful managers are, the higher the equity incentive intensity is, the lower the probability of setting long incentive contract performance time is; (2) the managerial power of state-owned companies have stronger influence on the contract design than private companies. |
keywords:Managerial power Nature of property right Equity incentive Contract design |
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