CEO权力、董事会稳定性与盈余管理

周冬华

CEO权力、董事会稳定性与盈余管理

引用本文：周冬华.CEO权力、董事会稳定性与盈余管理[J].财经理论与实践,2014,(6):45-52

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作者	单位
周冬华	（江西财经大学会计学院，江西南昌330013）

中文摘要:基于CEO和董事会相对权力的视角，研究了CEO权力和董事会稳定性对盈余质量的影响。研究发现，CEO权力越大，上市公司盈余管理程度越高；而稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。区分企业产权性质后发现，上述研究结论主要体现在民营企业中。进一步研究发现，CEO任期较短时，CEO相对董事会的权力较小，稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。但随着CEO任期的增长，CEO相对于董事会的权力越强，董事会并不能有效监督CEO操纵盈余管理行为。

中文关键词:CEO权力董事会稳定性盈余管理 CEO任期

CEO Power, Board Stability and Earnings Management

Abstract:As an important part of accounting research, earnings management has always been an attractive topic. This paper studied the effect of CEO power and board stability on earnings quality, and the results showed that CEO power was significantly positively correlated with the earnings management, but board stability could effectively weaken the positive relationship between the CEO power and earnings management. This finding was especially true in private public companies. This paper further found that stability board could effectively weaken the positive relationship between CEO power and earnings management when CEO tenure was short. But we didn't found that board stability can effectively weaken the positive relationship between CEO power and earnings management when CEO tenure is longer.

keywords:CEO power Board stability Earnings management CEO tenure

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