(武汉大学 经济与管理学院会计系,湖北 武汉430072)
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引用本文:陈冬.(武汉大学 经济与管理学院会计系,湖北 武汉430072)[J].财经理论与实践,2014,(4):91-97
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陈冬 (武汉大学 经济与管理学院会计系湖北 武汉430072) 
中文摘要:复杂不透明的避税交易为公司高管的自利行为提供了机会。国企高管薪酬激励扭曲程度较大,所握权力缺乏监督,当他们从显性薪酬契约中获得的货币性私有收益较低时,可以通过避税交易寻租,此时国有上市公司避税程度较大;国有上市公司与子公司、受同一母公司控制的其他公司发生的异常关联交易、以及对异常经营活动现金流的操纵是国企高管避税寻租的实现途径。但是,“四大”审计并不能对高管避税寻租产生治理作用。
中文关键词:货币性私有收益  避税  寻租
 
(Economics & Management School, Wuhan University, Hubei430072, Chian)
Abstract:Complex and opaque tax avoidance transactions provide opportunities for high-ranking managers' opportunistic behaviors. The incentive distortion degree of State-owned enterprises' high-ranking managers is higher than those of Non-SOEs because their compensation are regulated. High-ranking managers of SOEs like to seek hidden benefits and the companies' tax avoidance degree is high when they gain low monetary benefits from remuneration contracts. Abnormal related party transactions and real earnings managements through abnormal operating cash flow aggravate the relation between monetary benefits and tax avoidance. But, the "Big 4" auditors do not inhibit the rent-seeking through tax avoidance.
keywords:Monetary Private Benefits  Tax Avoidance  Rent Seeking
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