违规惩戒与企业信贷资源——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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引用本文:倪婷婷,李连军,朱秀丽.违规惩戒与企业信贷资源——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2014,(4):69-73
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倪婷婷,李连军,朱秀丽 (南京财经大学 会计学院江苏 南京210046) 
中文摘要:以因违规被处罚的上市公司为样本,考察处罚决定是否会影响企业的银行贷款。研究发现:在处罚公告后,违规企业的年度新增银行贷款额会比公告前年度降低;处罚决定越严厉,被处罚企业的年度新增银行贷款额下降越多。此外,处罚决定越严厉,被处罚企业的年度新增银行贷款额下降越多这一现象主要存在于市场化程度较高的地区,而在市场化程度较低地区并不明显。最后这一现象更多存在于民营企业而非国有企业中。
中文关键词:处罚决定  银行贷款  市场化程度
 
Does Penalty Decision Affect Firms' Bank Loans——Empirical Evidence from China Listed Companies
Abstract:This paper aims to test whether penalty decision will affect listed companies' bank loans. Firstly, our research finds that once the penalty announcement is released, the company's annual new bank loans will be declined than before. Secondly, the severity of penalty also influences the consequences of penalty. The more severe penalty the company receives, the more refusals of annual new bank loans it will have. Besides, after we classify total sample in accordance with the level of marketization, we find that firms in more marketized districts suffer more refusals of annual new bank loans if the penalty is severe, while this phenomenon is not found in less marketized district samples. Finally, this phenomenon is significant in private firms rather than state firms.
keywords:Penalty Decision  Bank Loan  Marketization Level
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