固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究
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引用本文:曹兴,秦耀华.固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究[J].财经理论与实践,2013,(5):107-111
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作者单位
曹兴,秦耀华 (1.湖南工业大学 商学院,湖南 株洲4120032.中南大学 商学院湖南 长沙410083) 
中文摘要:基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。
中文关键词:管理费  激励基金业绩  基金风险
 
Research on Management Fee Incentive to Fund Manager under Fixed Fee
Abstract:The design of management fee to fund managers mainly depends on their hard work and their ability to avoid risks. In the paper, a model of management fee has been established. Tested by the fund samples in China, it shows that management fee had little incentive on fund performance, and poor performance fund is related to a high management fee ratio, and management fee has a positive relationship with fund risk.
keywords:Management fee  Fund performance  Fund risk
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