风险偏好、监管强度与金融监管有效性——基于委托代理理论的博弈分析

江曙霞; 夏徐斌

风险偏好、监管强度与金融监管有效性——基于委托代理理论的博弈分析

引用本文：江曙霞，夏徐斌.风险偏好、监管强度与金融监管有效性——基于委托代理理论的博弈分析[J].财经理论与实践,2013,(5):2-8

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作者	单位
江曙霞，夏徐斌	（厦门大学金融系，福建厦门361005）

中文摘要:监管博弈过程中不同参与主体的风险偏好影响其有效性，对不同经营效率的金融机构监管的有效性也有差异。监管机构宜引入审核和惩罚等机制，提高监管强度，提升金融监管有效性。对高效率金融机构，监管机构宜采取原则导向的监管，给予更多的自主权，激发其竞争力和活力；对低效率金融机构，应采取规则导向的监管。同时，监管行为可更具灵活性，根据不同的风险偏好采取不同对策。

中文关键词:风险偏好监管强度金融监管有效性

Risk Preference, Supervision Intensity and the Effectiveness of the Financial Supervision：Game analysis bases on Principal-Agent Theory

Abstract:Structure of risk preference in the process of financial supervision will affect its effectiveness, so does operating efficiency of financial institution. Supervision authority should bring in institutions such as audit, penalty and so on, in order to improve supervision intensity and effectiveness. Efficient financial institutions should be endowed with more decision-making power, in which case financial authority should execute supervision based on principle rather than rule, to arouse their competitiveness and vitality. As to financial institutions with poor efficiency, supervision should be implemented on rule, and measures should be more flexible——different measure to different risk preference.

keywords:Risk preference Supervision intensity Effectiveness of financial supervision

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