纳税人税收遵从行为博弈分析

刘朝阳; 刘振彪

纳税人税收遵从行为博弈分析

引用本文：刘朝阳,刘振彪.纳税人税收遵从行为博弈分析[J].财经理论与实践,2013,(3):84-87

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作者	单位
刘朝阳,刘振彪	(中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083）

中文摘要:创建基于行为博弈的税收遵从均衡模型，将处于相同税收境况的纳税人视为一个群体，则个体纳税人选择税收遵从策略从纳税人群体角度来看就是以一定的概率选择该种策略。面对正常税务检查与严格税务检查并存的环境，纳税人税收遵从博弈稳定均衡策略形成不但取决于税制的特性，而且依赖于其他纳税人的税收遵从决策。依据税收遵从博弈均衡的形成机理，提出建立我国税收遵从激励监督机制的对策。

中文关键词:行为博弈论税收遵从纳税人均衡模型

A Behavioral Game Analysis of Taxpayer's Tax compliance

Abstract:This tax compliance harmonious model basing on behavioral game is constructed. Regarding the taxpayers in a certain condition alike tax circumstances as a colony, a taxpayer selects tax compliance strategy can be treated a probability from the point of the colony of the taxpayers. Confronted with circumstances in which the normal tax administration checking and the strict tax administration checking coexist, a taxpayer's tax compliance game stable strategy-making not only depends on taxation particularity, but also depends on the tax compliance strategy of other taxpayers. According to formation mechanism of tax compliance game balance, some suggestions have been provided about establishing the encouragement and monitoring system in tax compliance.

keywords:Behavioral game theory Tax compliance Taxpayer Balance model

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