终极控股股东差异、财务松懈与公司绩效——来自2007~2011年中国证券市场的经验证据
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引用本文:王文兵,干胜道,段华友.终极控股股东差异、财务松懈与公司绩效——来自2007~2011年中国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2013,(1):52-56
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王文兵,干胜道,段华友 (四川大学 工商管理学院,四川 成都610064) 
中文摘要:组织理论认为,财务松懈缓冲外部环境突变(波动),促进组织绩效提升;而代理理论认为,财务松懈诱发管理层自利,产生代理成本,有损组织绩效。以我国沪深A股上市公司2007~2011年报数据为样本,观察上市公司滞留财务松懈资源对公司绩效的影响。研究发现:终极控股股东不同,滞留财务松懈水平不同;财务松懈水平越高,公司绩效越差、绩效波动幅度越大,研究结论支持代理理论。
中文关键词:股东特质  财务松懈  自由现金流量  公司绩效
 
The Ultimate Controlling Shareholder,Financial Slack and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence from Securities Market since 2007 to 2009
Abstract:Organizational theory suggests that financial slack contributes to promoting organization performance by buffering the impact of external environment of the organization, however, agency theory believes that the accumulation of financial slack resources within the organization will be detrimental to organizational performance by increase the agency cost. Using the data from annual reports of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2011, the influence from financial slack to corporate performance has been researched. The results show that the level of financial slack changes with the difference of ultimate controlling shareholders. And the more financial slack is, the less the corporate performance is, which supports the sayings in agency theory.
keywords:Nature of shareholder  Financial slack  Free cash flow  Corporate performance
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