管理者短视偏差对企业投资行为影响研究——一个基于股东短期利益压力视角的实证
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引用本文:王海明,曾德明.管理者短视偏差对企业投资行为影响研究——一个基于股东短期利益压力视角的实证[J].财经理论与实践,2013,(1):34-38
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作者单位
王海明,曾德明 (湖南大学 工商管理学院湖南 长沙410082) 
中文摘要:基于股东短期利益压力的视角,以沪深两市2003~2009年间的A股上市公司为对象,采用多元回归分析就管理者短视偏差与企业短期投资间的关系及其对企业未来盈利能力、业绩水平和财务困境的影响进行研究。实证结果表明,管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资水平越高;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平的削弱作用越强,意味着管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资降低了企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业当期陷入财务困境可能性的削弱作用越弱,说明管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资虽然增大了企业风险,但是并不会加大企业当期陷入财务困境的可能性。
中文关键词:管理者短视偏差  企业投资行为  盈利能力  业绩水平  财务困境
 
An Empirical Study on the Effect of Managerial Myopia on the Corporate Investment Behavior: From the Perspective of Shareholders' Short term Profit Pressure
Abstract:Based on the data of A shared listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market from 2003 to 2009, this paper uses multi-variant regression method to study the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate temporary investments, as well as the influence on future profitability and current financial distress from the perspective of shareholders' short-term profit pressure. The empirical results show that: there is a positive relationship between managerial myopia and corporate temporary investments. And managerial myopia strengthen the restriction effect of temporary investments on future profitability and performance, which means the temporary investments of firms with shortsighted managers will reduce corporate profitability and performance in the future. Furthermore, the temporary investments of firms with shortsighted managers will increase corporate risk but can not cause them into financial distress currently.
keywords:Managerial myopia  Corporate investment behavior  Profitability  Performance  Financial distress
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