权力异化、国家审计与地方政府负债
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引用本文:蒲丹淋,王善平.权力异化、国家审计与地方政府负债[J].财经理论与实践,2012,(5):80-85
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作者单位
蒲丹淋,王善平 (湖南大学 工商管理学院湖南 长沙410079) 
中文摘要:地方官员权力异化和国家审计监管对地方政府负债行为有显著影响。官员权力异化越严重,地方政府债务增长速度越快,债务风险越大。但是,国家审计监管力量越强,越有可能降低官员权力异化对地方政府负债的影响程度,进而降低地方政府负债增长速度和债务风险。结果表明,较强的国家审计监管力度有助于防止地方政府官员权力滥用和寻租,规范地方政府融资行为。
中文关键词:权力异化  国家审计  地方政府负债
 
Public Power Dissimilation, State Audit and Local Government Liabilities
Abstract:The relationship between public power dissimilation, state audit supervision and local government liabilities has been investigated. The results show that the growth rate and the risk of local government liabilities will be increased when the power dissimilation is more serious. Moreover, strengthening state audit supervision helps reduce the adverse effects of public power dissimilation on local government liabilities and normalize local officials' finance behavior.
keywords:Public Power Dissimilation  State Audit  Local Government Liabilities
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