经济依赖度、盈余管理水平与审计独立性——来自上市商业银行的经验证据

武恒光; 张龙平

经济依赖度、盈余管理水平与审计独立性——来自上市商业银行的经验证据

引用本文：武恒光，张龙平.经济依赖度、盈余管理水平与审计独立性——来自上市商业银行的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2012,(4):74-79

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作者	单位
武恒光，张龙平	（1.山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014 2.中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073)

中文摘要:以2001~2010年我国上市商业银行为研究对象，从盈余管理的角度，以异常贷款损失拨备作为审计独立性的代理变量，以未预期费用作为经济依赖的代理变量，验证了审计师在银行业的经济依赖对审计独立性的影响。研究结果表明，未预期审计费用、总费用和非审计费用率对异常贷款损失拨备没有显著影响，而未预期非审计费用则对异常贷款损失拨备具有显著的负向影响。总体而言，审计师在为上市商业银行提供业务过程中，过高的经济依赖，促使其接受了客户的盈余管理偏好，审计独立性受到损害。 

中文关键词:审计独立性异常贷款损失拨备未预期费用

Economy Dependence, Earnings Management and Auditor Independence: Evidence from Listed Commercial Banks

Abstract:Using the data of listed commercial banks of 2001 to 2010, taking Abnormal loan loss provision representing the auditor independence and unexpected fee representing the economy dependence, the relationship of economy dependence and auditor independence is examined from the angle of earnings management. The results show that unexpected fees, overall fees and the ratio of unexpected fees have no significant effects on abnormal loan loss provision, while unexpected non-audit fees have significantly negative effects on abnormal loan loss provision. Overall, evidences show that auditors with high economy dependence will accept their clients' earnings management preference, then auditors independence is impaired.

keywords:Auditor independence Abnormal loan loss provision Unexpected fees

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