信用评级机构监管的演化动态博弈分析

刘晓剑; 张强

信用评级机构监管的演化动态博弈分析

引用本文：刘晓剑,张强.信用评级机构监管的演化动态博弈分析[J].财经理论与实践,2011,(6):30-34

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作者	单位
刘晓剑,张强	（湖南大学金融与统计学院，湖南长沙410079）

中文摘要:席卷全球的金融危机再一次证明了信用评级机构监管的必要性和重要性。在有限理性条件下，信用评级机构与监管主体行为博弈复制系统中存在五个均衡点，且在四种不同的情况下，演化趋向于不同的均衡点。分析结果证明，想要促进信用评级机构的公正行为，需要监管主体从四个方向入手：强化惩罚力度、充分发挥声誉约束、缩小非公正评级额外收益及提高监管效率。

中文关键词:信用评级机构政府监管演化博弈动态复制

Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric Game between CRAs and Relating Regulators

Abstract:The worldwide financial crisis shows us again the importance and indispensability of the regulation on the crediting rating agencies. Under the conditions of limited rationality, these are five equilibrium points in the replication system of game between credit rating agencies and regulators. And in four different situations, it closes to different equilibriums. The results prove that four ways can be used by regulators to control the illegal behaviors of credit rating agencies, including imposing severe penalty, prompting reputational constraint, bridging the revenue gap between illegal and legal behaviors and improving the regulation efficiency.

keywords:Credit rating agencies Government regulation Evolutionary game Dynamic replication

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