控股股东股利分配行为的监管博弈

李春玲; 蒋顺才

控股股东股利分配行为的监管博弈

引用本文：李春玲,蒋顺才.控股股东股利分配行为的监管博弈[J].财经理论与实践,2011,(3):40-43

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作者	单位
李春玲,蒋顺才	（1.燕山大学经济管理学院，河北秦皇岛066004 2.深圳市汇川投资有限公司，深圳518025）

中文摘要:对控股股东股利分配行为的监管，是监管部门和控股股东之间的博弈过程。均衡分析发现，监管部门的监管成本C越小、控股股东进行侵占造成的外部损失W（ζ）越大，控股股东进行规范分配的概率越大；控股股东持股比例L越高、对控股股东违规处罚的力度K越大，监管部门监管的概率越小。

中文关键词:监管部门控股股东监管股利分配博弈

The game between the Regulators and the Controlling Shareholders in Dividend Policies

Abstract:It is a game between the regulators and the controlling shareholders to monitoring dividend distribution. The equilibrium analysis shows that smaller regulatory cost C is,the bigger the external loss W（ζ）is, and the higher the probability of controlling shareholders making canonical dividend policy will be. However, the more shares the controlling shareholders are holding, the more punishments to irregularities are, and the less probability to supervise effectively.

keywords:Regulator Controlling shareholders Supervision Dividend policy Game

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