政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究
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引用本文:张功富.政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2011,(3):24-30
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作者单位
张功富 (郑州航空工业管理学院 会计学院河南 郑州450015) 
中文摘要:以2004~2009 年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府“掠夺之手理论”和“支持之手理论”提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。
中文关键词:政府干预  政治关联  过度投资  投资不足
 
Government Intervention,Political Connections and Corporate Inefficient Investment: Empirical Research by the Panel Data from Listed Company of China
Abstract:Using a sample of 701 listed firms from 2004 to 2009, the effects of local government intervention and political connections on the corporate inefficient investment have been studied. It is found that local government intervention has a negative impact on the overinvestment of the companies with free cash flow, and the negative impact even more on that of the state-owned companies. However, there is a positive impact on the underinvestment of the companies which are financing constrained, especially of the state-owned companies. These results indicate that local government has motive to grab or help the firms, which provides support for the theories of "grabbing hand model" and "helping hand model". It is also found that political connections are negatively related to both overinvestment and underinvestment, which indicates that political connections can be used as the substitution of investor protection to prevent the local government from expropriating the firms.
keywords:Government intervention  Political connections  Overinvestment  Underinvestment
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