地方税收竞争中公共品供给的动态博弈及应对思路

肖建华

地方税收竞争中公共品供给的动态博弈及应对思路

引用本文：肖建华.地方税收竞争中公共品供给的动态博弈及应对思路[J].财经理论与实践,2010,(5):78-81

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作者	单位
肖建华	（江西财经大学财税与公共管理学院,江西南昌330013）

中文摘要:地方税收竞争在中国具有普遍性，但与市场经济发达国家的税收竞争又存在着内容上的差异。从博弈分析来看，博弈参与主体在完全信息条件下，其最优结果是进行地方税收竞争且投入于公共品。但从中国的现实情况来看，公共品供给不足是源于制度上提供的潜在利益驱动地方政府偏离其应有责任。因此，减少政府层次、合理配给地方政府相对独立的税权、制定良好的公共支出政策是促使经济进入良性循环、地方税收竞争走向规范、有序的重要制度安排。

中文关键词:地方税收竞争公共品供给动态博弈

The Dynamic Game of Public Goods Supply in Local Taxation Competition

Abstract:Local taxation competition is a common phenomenon in China, however its contents are different from the one in developed countries. Under the condition of complete information, participants will choose taxation competition and invest in public goods. To China, however, sometimes local governments deviate from their intended direction due to the institution defects, which cause to the insufficience of public supply. In order to upgrade the economic circle, three measures should be taken: reducing local government levels, distribute relatively independent taxation duty to local government, and perfect the public expenditure policies.

keywords:Local taxation competition Public goods supply Dynamic game

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