国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护

万宇洵; 彭建霞; 万可人

国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护

引用本文：万宇洵,彭建霞,万可人.国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护[J].财经理论与实践,2010,(4):43-47

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作者	单位
万宇洵	(1.湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410079 2.湖南第一师范学院经管系,湖南长沙410205)
彭建霞
万可人

中文摘要:利用2007年我国国有控股公司数据，以中小股东利益保护为因变量，以高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费为主要考察对象，并选取公司规模和股权制衡结构作为控制变量，检验在不同激励方式下高管薪酬与中小股东利益的相关性，结论表明：国有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于现金薪酬和在职消费，对中小股东利益侵害较大，而高管持股则可以保护中小投资者利益。

中文关键词:高管薪酬现金股利会计盈余质量公司规模股权制衡

Analysis between Executive Compensation Incentive and Minority Investor Protection in State owned Listed Companies

Abstract:This paper defines minority investor protection as dependent variable ,while cash salary, the proportion of holdings and non pecuniary compensation of executives as investigative objects, and selects company size and counter balance towards the largest shareholder as control variables. Using the year 2007 data of state owned listed company, we test the relationship between the executive compensation and interests of minority investors in different incentives. The results show that executive compensation of state owned listed companies focuses on cash salary and non-pecuniary compensation. Therefore they will violate the interests of minority investors, while the proportion of holdings can help to protect minority investors.

keywords:Executive Compensation Cash Dividend Quality of Accounting Earnings Company Size Counter balance towards the Largest Shareholder

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